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Local Regulation of Billboards:
Settled and Unsettled Legal Issues
Frayda S. Bluestein
Local ordinances regulating billboards, like other local
land use regulations, must strike a balance between achieving
a regulatory purpose and minimizing interference with pri-
vate property rights. Since billboards contain constitution-
ally protected speech, both commercial and noncommercial,
an additional layer of legal principles must be taken into
account in developing billboard regulations. In addition,
evaluating the impact of regulations on property rights has
become complicated and unsettled due to several recent
federal court decisions dealing with claims that local regula-
tions containing amortization or removal provisions for
nonconforming signs effect an unconstitutional taking of
property without compensation. As in any other area of
regulation, settled law gives clear guidance to the ordinance
drafter; unsettled law makes for difficult drafting and policy
decisions. The purpose of this article is to summarizesome of
the legal issues that have been raised in federal and North
Carolina state court cases involving challenges to billboard
regulations, to identify some of the issues that appear to be
settled, and to discuss some that are not.
Statutory Authority and Public Purpose
A local regulation, to be valid, must serve a public purpose
and must be within the scope of a state statute granting the
local government the power to regulate the subject matter.
The public purposes local governments have cited in support
of billboard regulations have evolved along with the bill-
board structure itself and changing social values. Early sign
ordinances were designed to protect against safety and fire
hazards posed by wooden signs placed low to the ground. As
signs have become larger, higher and more numerous along
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roadways, the basis for regulating them has changed. The
primary purposes identified in support of modern billboard
regulations are traffic safety and aesthetics. Related regula-
tory goals include economic development, promotion of
tourism, historic preservation, and protection of the public
investment in the highways. Any of these purposes is likely to
be upheld as a legitimate public purpose for billboard regu-
lations, as long as they are articulated and rationally related
to the means used to regulate (as contained in the ordinance).
When local ordinances are challenged, the courts are
careful not to second guess the legislative decisions and
policy choices made by the local government, instead defer-
ring to the judgment of the legislative body. Accordingly,
early decisions dealing with billboard regulations summarily
approved the health and safety justifications for regulating
signs. 1 Later, when reviewing regulations based on aesthet-
ics, the courts were initially hesitant to find that aesthetics
alone was a sufficient public purpose to justify billboard
regulation. Most billboard ordinances are based on aesthet-
ics along with other purposes, usually traffic safety, so courts
could uphold the ordinance without having to directly ad-
dress the strength of the aesthetics basis.
In 1981, perhaps reflecting a change in social values and
the growing environmental movement, the United States
Supreme Court handed down the landmark billboard case of
Metromedia v. City ofSan Diego, upholding, for the most part,
a comprehensive local billboard ordinance.2 The Metrome-
dia decision held, among other things, that the city's interest
in avoiding visual clutter was a legitimate public purpose for
billboard regulation. Both federal and state courts in North
Carolina have also now expressly sanctioned billboard regu-
lation for aesthetic purposes, along with other types of aes-
thetics-based regulation, such as those for junkyards and for
historic preservation.3Although the type and extent of regu-
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lation that may be justified by aesthetic concerns remain
uncertain, it is now well settled that aesthetics is a legitimate
public purpose upon which regulation may be based.
Since local governments derive all regulatory authority, by
way of delegation, from the state legislature, billboard regu-
lation must be within the scope of a state statute authorizing
such regulation. Most sign regulations are contained in
zoning ordinances and have uniformly been considered to
fall within the scope of the zoning enabling legislation. A
recent North Carolina case addressed the question of whether
billboard regulations adopted outside of a zoning ordinance
are statutorily authorized.
Henderson County, like most North Carolina counties,
does not have zoning throughout the county. Nonetheless,
the county sought to regulate billboards county-wide by
adopting a billboard ordinance under its general ordinance-
making authority rather than its zoning authority. 4 A bill-
board company challenged the ordinance on the grounds,
among others, that the zoning authority, which requires
consistency with a comprehensive plan, public hearing, no-
tice and other procedural protections, is the only authority
pursuant to which local billboard regulations may be adopted.
The court rejected this argument and ruled that the general
ordinance-making statute authorizes billboard regulation. 5
It is important to note that in the Henderson County case,
public hearing and notice were provided, even though they
were not required as would have been the case had the
regulation been a zoning ordinance. Thus there was no
evidence that the general ordinance-making authority was
used to avoid the procedural protections built into the zon-
ing enabling statute. If the general ordinance-making au-
thority were used under circumstances where zoning was in
place and could have been used, a question could be raised
about whether the intent was to avoid the procedural re-
quirements of zoning, and a court might reach a different
decision. Furthermore, if a billboard ordinance were struc-
tured according to districts or otherwise established distinc-
tions justifiable only by reference to a comprehensive plan,
use of the general, rather than the zoning, authority could
expose the ordinance to a constitutional equal protection or
due process challenge. Bearing in mind these precautions,
billboard regulations can be validly enacted pursuant to the
general ordinance-making, as well as the zoning, authority.
The Outdoor Advertising Control Act
Another state statute indirectly affects local regulation of
billboards: North Carolina's Outdoor Advertising Control
Act. This act prohibits the erection of billboards within 660
feet of, or that would be visible from, federal aid primary
highways.6 Signs located in commercial or industrial zones
and areas are allowed within 660 feet of the highway under
the statute. Local governments are not prohibited from
regulating in areas outside of the coverage of the act, or
through means that are more strict than those contained in
the act.7 With respect to removal or amortization of noncon-
forming billboards, discussed in more detail below, local
government authority is explicitly limited by N.C.G.S. §136-
131.1, a part of the state Outdoor Advertising Control Act.
That section requires payment of compensation for removal
of any sign that is allowed under the act and for which a valid
permit has been obtained. To avoid potential conflicts with
the state law, some local ordinances exempt signs located on
federal aid primary highways from amortization and other
provisions.
The state Outdoor Advertising Control Act, along with
the various enabling statutes governing local regulatory
authority, are, of course, subject to change, and should be
reviewed before drafting or adopting local billboard regula-
tions.
Constitutional Issues: Free Speech
Unlike other land use regulations, sign regulations affect
communication that is protected by both the state and federal
constitutions. Regulations affecting speech fall into two
major categories for purposes of judicial review: content-
neutral and content-based. The standards of judicial review
are more stringent if a regulation is content-based, that is, if
the. regulation targets a particular message. On the other
hand, regulations that restrict the time, place and manner of
speech on a content-neutral basis, that is, without reference
to the particular message, are less strictly reviewed by the
courts and are likely to be upheld as long as they have a
rational basis. In addition, although the Constitution pro-
tects both commercial speech (advertising) and noncommer-
cial speech, commercial speech receives less protection than
noncommercial speech. This means that the courts scrutinize
more closely regulations that affect noncommercial speech
and will require a stronger justification for restrictions on
noncommercial than for commercial speech.
Most billboard ordinances are content-neutral time, place,
and manner regulations, designed to regulate the impact of
the structure, not the content of the message it displays. The
courts have determined that regulations based on distinc-
tions between commercial and noncommercial signs are
content-neutral. Similarly, regulations that distinguish be-
tween on-premise and off-premise8 signs are considered
content-neutral. In contrast, in the Metromedia case, dis-
cussed above, the United States Supreme Court made it clear
that narrower categories of signs are considered content-
based and, in that case, did not withstand the stricter level of
scrutiny. The San Diego ordinance exempted, among other
categories, government signs, religious symbols, time or
temperature signs, commemorative plaques, and temporary
political signs. The Court held that, "Although the city may
distinguish between the relative value of different categories
ofcommercial speech, the city does not have the same range
ofchoice in the area ofnoncommercial speech to evaluate the
strength of, or distinguish between, various communicative
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interests."9 Thus, courts may give more leeway for distinc-
tions among types of commercial speech, since it is afforded
less protection under the constitution, as long as the distinc-
tions have a rational basis. But distinctions among types of
noncommercial speech are likely to be invalidated unless
supported by a very strong governmental justification.
Another extremely important rule emanating from the
Metromedia decision relates to the comparative effect of a
billboard regulation on commercial signs and noncommer-
cial signs. The ordinance that was the subject ofiheMetrome-
dia decision prohibited all off-premise commercial signs, but
allowed on-premise commercial signs. Certain narrow cate-
gories of noncommercial signs were exempt from the ordi-
nance, as discussed above. In general, however, the effect of
the ordinance was to favor commercial over noncommercial
expression because on-premise commercial signs were al-
lowed but an on-premise sign containing a nonexempt,
noncommercial message would be prohibited. The court
held that this reversed the priority ofprotection mandated by
the constitution which has been held to afford the greatest
protection to noncommercial (usually political or religious)
expression, and only a lesser degree to commercial expres-
sion. To avoid this unconstitutional reversal of priorities an
ordinance can allow noncommercial speech in any forum and
under at least equal conditions as commercial speech. An
ordinance does not violate the constitutionally mandated
hierarchy if it contains a statement that the ordinance does
not apply to noncommercial signs, or that any sign allowed
under the ordinance may display noncommercial in lieu of
commercial messages.
Sign regulations often do not distinguish between on-premise andoff-premise signs. An on-premise sign (shown at left) advertises
a business or activity located on the same lot orparcel as the sign.
Constitutional Issues: Takings
The major unsettled area of law relating to billboard
regulations arises out of the constitutional requirement that
property may not be taken for governmental purposes with-
out just compensation. Regulations that substantially inter-
fere with private property rights have been held to effect a
regulatory taking, that is, a takingwithout the formal exercise
of the condemnation power, and are unconstitutional if
compensation is not paid to the affected property owner.
Takings claims increasingly havebecome a basis for challeng-
ing local land use regulations that fail to strike the balance,
discussed above, between regulatory goals and individual
property rights. A takings claim is very difficult to establish
because it requires a showing that all or nearly all use of the
property is restricted by the challenged regulation. No re-
ported North Carolina case has ever held (and withstood
appeal) that a local regulation effected a taking. Several
recent federal court cases arising out of North Carolina have
refused to dismiss takings claims asserted against local bill-
board ordinances, and the outcome of those cases, which are
still pending, is uncertain. The takings analysis applied in
those cases is important to review and follow as much as
possible in developing future billboard and other local regu-
lations.
The courts have developed a descriptive test for determin-
ing when a law effects a regulatory taking. In North Carolina,
the "law of the land" clause contained in Article I, Section 19
of the state constitution (the state equivalent of the federal
takings clause) has been interpreted by the courts to require
that a regulation must be reasonably related to a legitimate
public purpose and may not
completely deprive property
owners of the beneficial use
of their property. Stated
another way, a regulation
effects a taking if it deprives
the owner of all practical
use of property and the
property is rendered of no
reasonable value. The
United States Supreme
Court has articulated the
standard for purposes of
federal constitutional tak-
ings analysis by stating that
an ordinance effects a tak-
ing if it does not substan-
tially advance a legitimate
public purpose or if it de-
nies an owner economically
viable use of his land. The
federal and state standards
are viewed to be substan-
tially the same.
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The first element of the takings standard is essentially an
ends-means analysis. The issue is whether the means chosen
are reasonably necessary to accomplish the stated purpose of
the regulation. The second part of the test focuses on the
interference with property rights, in determining whether
that interference is reasonable in degree. Obviously, these
judicial tests are not susceptible to formulaicapplication, but
must be applied and evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Al-
though the tests, as applied in previous cases, give some
guidance, it is often difficult to know when an ordinance will
be ruled to have gone too far in interfering with property
rights so as to effect an unconstitutional taking.
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court handed down
several important takings cases. 10 The case most relevant to
billboard regulations is Keystone Bituminous Coal Associa-
tion v. DeBenedictits. 11 In that case the Court revisited the
state of Pennsylvania's efforts to restrict the amount of coal
removed from heavily mined areas in order to prevent subsi-
dence of the surface land estate. A 1922 Supreme Court
decision striking down a similar law was the first case to
establish the regulatory taking doctrine. 12 The Keystone court
upheld the modern law, which had undoubtedly been care-
fully researched, supported and drafted to avoid the pitfalls
that led to the invalidation of the earlier law. The Keystone
opinion reemphasizes two significant elements of takings
law. The first element is that the takings analysis is a balanc-
ing test. Thus a strong public purpose may justify a more
intrusive regulation than will a less compelling purpose. The
second element is that to satisfy the second prong of the
takings test, a property owner must demonstrate that the
challenged regulation causes a deprivation of aggregate property
rights, not just a decrease in profits that may be gained from
use of the property, and not just the complete elimination of
isolated segments of property.
Neither Keystone nor the other recent takings cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court changed the substance of the
takings analysis. Nonetheless, they seem to have inspired a
move toward a more thorough evaluation of takings claims.
This shift in judicial attitude can be seen in the billboard
cases now pending in the North Carolina federal district
courts.
In 1986, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a
Raleigh sign ordinance against, among others, a takings
challenge. The ordinance limited the size and location of
billboards and required that billboards not brought into
conformity with the ordinance within five and one-halfyears
must be removed. On a summaryjudgment motion.a motion
filed before trial, the court held that there was no evidence in
the record demonstrating that the ordinance deprived the
plaintiff billboard company of all use of its property. The five
and one-half year period, called an amortization provision,
was held to be a reasonable means of allowing the property
owner to recover some of the investment in the signs prior to







Unlike other land use regulations, sign regtlations affect communication that is
protected by the state and federal constitutions. In reviewing sigi ordinances,
courtslookattheeffectoflheordinanceon non-commercial (sign at top) aswell
as commercial speech (sign at bottom).
use regulations and have been sanctioned by the courts as a
way of decreasing the impact of regulations on affected
property owners, and as a way of achieving the necessary
balance more equitably than if the regulation were to take
immediate effect. 14
The cities of Durham and Waynesville adopted ordi-
nances banning all off-premise signs and providing five and
one-half year and four-year amortization periods, respec-
tively. Both ordinances have been challenged, and both cases
have been appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
and have been remanded to the lower court for additional
evidentiary proceedings. In the Durham case, the lower
court, like the court in the Raleigh case, had decided in favor
of the city on a summary judgment motion. The Waynesville
ordinance was held to be invalid on a summary judgment
motion. Both cases were remanded by the appellate court
with specific instructions to determine, by thorough evalu-
ation of the evidence, the impact ofthe respective ordinances
on the claimants' property. 15
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Although the standard for what constitutes a taking has
not changed since the decision in the Raleigh case and the
decisions in the Durham and Waynesville cases, it appears
that the court's approach to these cases has changed some-
what, perhaps shifting a burden to the local government to
show that an ordinance is reasonable, rather than relying
solelyon the ability or failure ofthe claimant to come forward
with evidence of a taking. The Durham court of appeals
decision states that, "Recent cases decided by the Supreme
Court raise questions about the propriety of summary judg-
ment of takings claims without a fully developed factual
record."16 In other words, the court cannot decide if an ordi-
nance goes too far without detailed evidence as to how far the
ordinance goes.
The Court ofAppeals has given specific instructions to the
lower courts in the Durham and Waynesville cases on the
facts to be reviewed in determining the impact of the chal-
lenged ordinances on the claimants' property. The laundry
list reads as follows:
The court should make findings pertaining to every aspect
of [the claimant's] business that will be affected by the or-
dinance, including the number of billboards that can be
economically used for noncommercial advertising, the
number that are economically useless, the terms of [the
claimant's] leases for billboard locations, the land [the
claimant] owns for locations and whether it has any other
economic use, the cost of billboards that cannot be used,
the depreciation taken on these billboards and their actual
life expectancy, the income expected during the grace
period, the salvage value ofbillboards that cannot be used,
the loss of sharing revenue, the percentage of affected
signs compared to the remaining signs in [the claimant's]
business unit, the relative value of affected and remaining
signs, whether the amortization period is reasonable, and
any other evidence presented by the parties that the court
deems relevant. 17
Motions on various legal issues are currently pending in
both of these cases.
Perhaps the most unsettled and difficult issue raised in the
Durham case is one that must be resolved before any of the
factual inquiries listed above can take place. The court must
first identify the appropriate unit of property to which the
takings analysis is to be applied. The plaintiff billboard
company argued that the appropriate unit ofproperty is each
individual billboard that must be removed under the ordi-
nance. The court rejected this argument, stating that, as with
the pillars ofcoal in the Keystone case, property rights are not
viewed in segments for purposes of takings analysis. Instead,
the court appears to suggest that the claimant's business or
aggregate sign holdings in the area covered by the ordinance
is the appropriate focus of the inquiry. Thus the parties may
also have to present evidence relating to the particular cor-
porate structure and marketing practices of the claimant in
order to characterize a property interest that is entitled to
constitutional protection.
Although the outcome of these and other pending bill-
board cases cannot be predicted, the factual disputes and
legal issues being argued in these cases should be closely
monitored by planners, drafters, and policy-makers consid-
ering billboard regulations. Settled issues and ordinances
upheld in earlier cases can be used as guideposts in identify-
ing provisions and regulatory schemes that are likely to be
upheld if challenged. In each case, however, ordinance pro-
visions and stated purposes must be tailored to the condi-
tions existing in the regulating community. Despite numer-
ous unsettled issues in applying the takings analysis, the clear
message of the recent billboard cases is that takings analysis
requires a detailed factual inquiry. Local governments are
well advised to perform as much of this inquiry as possible
and evaluate the potential impact of theordinance within the
community during the period before adoption of billboard
regulations, rather than to risk having to develop the record
for purposes of litigation.
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